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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 900284-CA
Priority No. 2

MICHAEL SAMUEL WEAVER,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989), whereby a defendant in a district
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a
first degree or capital felony.

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and
constitutional provisions are provided in Addendum A:
U.S. Const, amend. IV;
Utah Const, art , 1, § 14;
U.C.A. § 76-6-404 (1989);
U.C.A. § 77-23-3 (1989).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court erred in denying Michael Weaver's

motion to suppress under the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution?
a.

In its determination of probable cause, did the

trial court err in approving the "Affidavit For Search Warrant"
which contained conclusory statements and insufficient information?
b.

Should the affidavit have been rejected under a

"totality-of-the-circumstances" analysis?
2.

Did the trial court erred in denying Michael Weaver's

motion to suppress under Article If Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution?
a.

How would the issues presented under the Federal

Constitution be resolved under the Utah Constitution?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellate courts will reverse a trial court's factual
assessment underlying a decision to deny a suppression motion when
"it clearly appears that the lower court was in error.

Clear error

is indicated when the trial court's factual assessment is against
the clear weight of the evidence or it induces a firm conviction
that a mistctke has been committed."

State v. Droneburq, 781 P.2d

1303, 1304 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On May 12, 1989, the Honorable Sheila McCleve signed a
warrant authorizing the search of 1316 East 3900 South,
Addendum B.

See

On March 15, 1990, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick

considered Defendant/Appellant Michael Samuel Weaver's motion to
suppress evidence seized during the search on the grounds that the
warrant was invalid.

Record [hereinafter referred to as "R"] at

148; Transcript of March 15, 1990 Motion to Suppress Proceedings
[hereinafter referred to as "MS"] at 2-32.

Weaver's motion was

denied following the proceeding and then renewed and rejected again
at trial.

Transcript of March 27 & 28, 1990 Trial Proceedings

[hereinafter referred to as "T"] at 32. On March 28, 1990, a jury
found Michael Weaver not guilty of Burglary, a third degree felony,
(R 96), and guilty of Theft, a felony of the third degree, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1989).

(R 95).

On

April 10, 1990, Judge Frederick sentenced Michael Weaver to zero to
five years in the Utah State Prison, together with an oiler of
restitution, a fine, and a recoupment fee.

(R 123).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On or about May 7, 1989, "someone" burglarized "Dusty's
Vans" and took property valued at over ; iiiit). See Detective Leslie
Kent Powers' Affidavit For Search Warrant [hereinafter referred to
as "Powers' Affidavit"j, page ? (attached as Addendum B).

- 3 -

Two

witnesses, Jay and Linda Lawrence,1 "stated that they were awakened
at 700 hours on May 7, 1989 by someone who was jumping back and
forth over a fence between her residence (apartment) and Dusty's
Vans."

The witnesses described the suspect and later identified him

as Michael Weaver.

Powers' Affidavit, page 3.

Michael Weaver resided at 1328 East 3900 South with his
grandmother.

He was then on "Intense Supervised Parole for

Receiving Stolen Property and . . . supervised by Sally Powell fron
the Department of Corrections."

Powers' Affidavit, page 3.

mother resided nearby at 1316 East 3900 South.

His

Powers' Affidavit,

pages 1 & 3.
Detective Powers interviewed "Ms. Powell who allege[d] that
on May 11, 1989, Weaver made numerous trips (5-6) between the houses
and in fact was at the house to be searched on the evening of
May 10, 1989."

Powers' Affidavit, page 3.

Detective Powers then

alleged, "through his experience and belief that Weaver, being on
Intense Supervised Parole, would not keep stolen property at his
primary residence knowing that such a place could and is routinely
searched by Parole Officers."

Powers' Affidavit, page 3.

Because

of the above-mentioned circumstances and Weaver's activity, Powers
alleged, there was probable cause "to believe that the stolen
property sought to be seized" was located at 1316 East 3900 South

1

Jay and Linda "Larance" are the same Jay and Linda
"Lawrence" who witnessed the reported crime. Compare (T 34) with
Addendum B.

- 4

(the residence of Michael Weaver's mother).

Powers' Affidavit,

page 3.
Detective Powers recited the preceding facts in his
affidavit and presented it to the Honorable Sheila McCleve on
May 12, 1989. Judge McCleve signed the warrant authorizing a search
of the 1316 East 3900 South residence.

At approximately 1:16 p.m.,

May 12, 1989, Detective Powers and various members of Adult
Probation and Parole [AP&P] searched Michael Weaver's residence and
his mother's residence for evidence of the reported crime.

Evidence

believed to have been stolen from Dusty's Vans was found in a
storage shed located beside 1316 East 3900 South.

The police

confiscated the evidence found in the shed and one item, a
television, found in the mother's home.

(MS 9, 14).

On March 15, 1990, during a Motion to Suppress proceeding
before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Michael Weaver moved to
suppress the evidence seized by the State.

(R 148) ; (MS 2-32).

Michael Weaver established that he had received permission to use
his mother's home and her storage shed.

(MS 20).

Weaver placed a

lock on the shed door and was only one of two people who possessed a
key for the lock.

(MS 21-22).

Michael Weaver argued that the

"Affidavit For Search Warrant" was not supported by "probable
cause."

The Court denied his motion following the proceeding and

then again when Weaver renewed his objection at trial.

(T 32).

At trial Jay and Linda Lawrence testified that on the
morning of May 7, 1989, they awoke to the sounds of "the clanking of
the fence."

(T 43).

They looked out of their window and observed

- 5
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"this guy jumping over a fence, throwing things over • . ."
(T 35). Jay Lawrence yelled, "Hey, what's going on over there?"
(T 35, 45). The "guy," Michael Weaver, "walked up to [their] lawr,
. . . came up to [their] window, and attempted to explain his
conduct.

(T 35, 45). Jay Lawrence then saw Weaver get into his

truck and drive out of the apartment parking lot.

(T 38). The

Lawrences told the police,2 including Detective Powers, what they
had observed.

(T 46, 47, 50, 55).

While denying any participation in the burglary, Weaver
acknowledged that he did "come into possession of certain items frcm
that burglary."

(T 32, 96). The jury found Michael Weaver "guilty"

of Theft, and "not guilty" of Burglary.

(R 95-96).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The affidavit used in support of the search warrant was
invalid.

Acting on nothing more than a "hunch," the police simply

concluded that since Michael Weaver may have been involved in a
burglary, he may have also kept property in his house or in his
mother's house.

The police knew that they could search the house oi

Michael Weaver, a parolee, at any time.

But in order to "justify"

the search of his mother's house, the police attempted to form a
nexus between the two residences based solely on an "allegation"
which stated that four days after the burglary, "Weaver made
numerous trips (5-6)" to his mother's house.

2

See infra note 8.

The allegation did not

state improper conduct, especially due to the close proximity of the
two residences, the familial relationship involved, and the lapse of
time which had expired.

The affidavit also lacked a "substantial

basis" for crediting the hearsay and for the conclusion reached by
the affiant.

Under the federal "totality of the circumstances"

analysis, the court erred in finding that probable cause existed.
Under the Utah Constitution, the court similarly erred
because the "veracity" and "basis of the knowledge" requirements
were not fulfilled.

There was no indication that the allegation of

the hearsay informant, a parole officer, was based on personal
knowledge, or that the allegation was corroborated by other sources,
or that it was reliable.

The "totality of the circumstances"

analysis should not be followed.
Pursuant to either analysis, the probable cause necessary
for an arrest is different than the probable cause required for a
search.

Probable cause does not exist for the search of each and

every residence that a "suspect" happens to visit.
obtained evidence should have been suppressed.
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The illegally

ARGUMENT
POINT I
NO PROBABLE CAUSE SUPPORTED THE ISSUANCE OF THE
SEARCH WARRANT UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution
states in relevant part:

"no Warrants shall issue, but upon

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized."

U.S. Const, amend. IV.

The language and interpretation cf

the fourth amendment governs the arguments initially presented by
Defendant/Appellant Michael Samuel Weaver.

As revealed below, the

court should not have issued a search warrant based upon the
affidavit submitted by the investigating officer.

The affidavit dii

not contain sufficient information for a determination of "probable
cause," and alleged nothing more than conclusions.
In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the United
States Supreme Court held that the "probable cause" requirement
would be determined under a "totality of the circumstances"
analysis.

"The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a

practical, common sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the
'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence
of a crime will be found in a particular place."
at 238.

Gates, 462 U.S.

Though seemingly broad, the Court narrowed the application
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of the "totality of the circumstances" standard just one year later
in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
The Leon Court acknowledged the deference usually accorded
the issuing magistrate's determination but specifically added:
Deference to the magistrate, however, is not
boundless . . . [R]eviewing courts will not defer to
a warrant based on an affidavit that does not
"provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for
determining the existence of probable cause."
"Sufficient information must be presented to the
magistrate to allow that official to determine
probable cause; his action cannot be a mere
ratification of the bare conclusions of others."
Even if the warrant application was supported
by more than a "bare bones" affidavit, a reviewing
court may properly conclude that, notwithstanding
the deference that magistrates deserve, the warrant
was invalid because the magistrate's probable cause
determination reflected an improper analysis of the
totality of the circumstances, or because the form
of the warrant was improper in some respect.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 914-15 (citations omitted).
In the case at bar, the "Affidavit For Search Warrant"
submitted by Detective Leslie Kent Powers summarized the findings of
a recent burglary investigation.3

Detective Powers interviewed two

witnesses, Jay and Linda Lawrence, who described the suspect and
later identified him as Michael Weaver.

The affidavit also stated:

Weaver is currently on intense supervised
parole for receiving stolen property and is
supervised by Sally Powell from the Department of
Corrections. Weaver resides at 1328 East 3900 South
with his grandmother. Weaver's mother [Carol
Ahlstrom] resides at the house to be searched [1316
East 3900 South].

3

See infra note 8.

Affiant has interviewed Ms. Powell who alleges
that on May 11, 1989, Weaver made numerous trips
(5-6) between the houses and in fact was at the
house to be searched on the evening of May 10, 1989.
Affiant alleges through his experience and
belief that Weaver, being on intense supervised
parole, would not keep stolen property at his
primary residence knowing that such a place could
and is routinely searched by parole officers.
Further, affiant alleges that there is probable
cause, because of the above-mentioned circumstances
and Weaver's activity, to believe that the stolen
property sought to be seized is located at the
property to be searched hereby.
See Addendum B.
Initially, a distinction should be made between the
probable cause necessary to arrest an individual and the probable
cause necessary to search an individual's house.
The fact that there is probable cause to believe
that a person has committed a crime does not
automatically give the police probable cause to
search his house for evidence of that crime. If
that were so, there would be no reason to
distinguish search warrants from arrest warrants,
and cases like Chimel v. California . . . would make
little sense. We have consistently held that facts
must exist in the affidavit which establish a nexus
between the house to be searched and the evidence
sought . . . However, that nexus may be established
either through direct observation or through normal
inferences as to where the articles sought would be
located.
United States v. Vastola. 670 F.Supp. 1244, 1271 (D.N.J. 1987)
(citations omitted).
The sole "fact" which "established" a nexus between the
house to be searched and the evidence sought was Ms. Powell's
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allegation 4

(b-ti)

Weaver made numerous trips

between the houses and
the fvenir:; 01 *Wj _,,

house to be searched on
•*

'

e w e r s ' ^I'lda-iif

pi<j>

'. .Addendum B.

THE ALLEGATION DID NOT PROVIDE THE COURT WITH A
SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE
OF PROBABLE CAUSE
The "nexus*"1 jeaaniu Detective Powers to believe that
Michael Weaver had placed stolen prop*
J .

j

^

Sally Powell.

M s . Powell

though, was just
these "trips

mother's house was
t

* Weaver did
e

lid numerous othe*

Mcs.

-?*>**
inform

personally observe their
v

formants made the

"a substantial basis for crediting the v -,
States,

if,.1, U

i'-i'' i J :n o i ,

st^-:e d u :
.

* present

~>..'±L...

United

If Ms, Powell had personal knowledge

of these "trips," there wai.-. m» mji'poi t i vo evidence to corroborate
het

story and no proof that she had previously p n vidod

Powers with
3 62 U.S. 2b

rt.vi

nformation.

Detective

But cf. Jones v. United States,

MIU) (hearsay

i supporting the issuance of

a warrant was proper when the informant's report was based «»n the
informant's personal knowledge, the informant had previously

1

Other facts did exist which could have led Detective
Powers to believe that Michael Weaver would not have kept "stolen
property at his primary residence," but no other facts
e x i s t e d — o t h e r than the allegation of M s . P o w e l l — w h i c h would have
led the detective to believe that Weaver kept the property at his
mother's house.
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provided accurate information, and the informant's story was
corroborated by other sources).
Moreover, Ms. Powell's allegation revealed entirely
innocent behavior.

Michael Weaver lived at 1328 East 3900 South.

His mother, Carol Ahlstrom, lived at 1316 East 3900 South.5
Affidavit, pages 1 & 3; Addendum B.

Powers'

Making "numerous trips" between

the two houses was not criminal conduct, nor was it even improper
conduct.

The two houses were in close proximity to one another and

there was a familial relationship involved.

Michael Weaver

frequently visited his mother's home, often using her washer and
telephone.

(MS 20).

An individual on "Intense Supervised

Probation," like Michael Weaver, could properly leave his home for
extended periods of time and nothing precluded him from visicing his
mother.6

See (T 69).

right to be there."

The State even acknowledged that "he had a
(MS 30).

5

Michael Weaver's standing for the search was well
established during the Motion to Suppress and at trial. He had
received permission to use his mother's home and her storage shed.
(MS 20). His expectation of privacy was evident to others through
the lock which he placed on the door. (MS 21). He was only one of
two people who possessed a key for the lock. (MS 21-22).
Individuals outside the family could not gain access to the shed.
The officers opened the lock after obtaining the key from Weaver.
(T 9). Cf. Minnesota v. Olson, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990).
6

As a parolee on "Intense Supervision," Michael Weaver
had either a 7:00 p.m. curfew, at which time he was required to be
at his residence and then remain there until 6:00 a.m. the next
morning; or a 9:00 p.m. curfew with a 6:00 a.m. check out time.
(T 68, 69, 75). In either situation, there would be nothing unusual
about him visiting his mother's residence five or six times on
May 11, 1989. The fact that he was at his mother's house the night
before, May 10, 1989, supports the frequency of his visits.
Moreover, as his trial testimony revealed, his "numerous trips" were
completely innocent. (T 103).
- 12 -

The situdf i OP li-i'f'y have been different If the houses were
far apart, «,»!' i' i "mother/son" i e. I fit mnsh • r irl i.ot exist f or even
:i f Mi

h w l l . alleged tha1" Weaver had in laci c a n K M inipurVv or

"fruits

t the crun<-M i n»

=e residence to 1 lie othei „

these circumstances existed, howeve

iiui^ll merely alleged

1989, Weaver made numerous trips (l"-bj betw»"Mi the

"that <m H ,y II
houses

Hone of

' Addendi lm
Also absent from the allegat

compara

ement

often,

average, Michael Weav

"frequented" his mother'

visits were frequer*

next is could not have • r established through ;
behavior-

* ck1 ««,), IVJ

Powell's allegation did

time period involved for Michael W»?avrr'
his visits consistent with "meal hours"
cycle" for a " -

•

trips \-ii the * .me interval

aundry?

- -<r
}

indicate I he
Were

"w.'ish and

dry

Regardless of the numbei of

deged, Mi chat1! Weaver's "activity"1 was

not inconsistent with his "parolee" program restr ict i MII^
(T 69)

xmaL

"numerous trips,11
.- • . *

a

See

The dilegatj nil was "so lacking in indicia of probable cause

as to render official belief .in its existence
untuds

State v, Droneburq, 781 P.2d 1303, 1 304 .nii-at. /i)ip,

1989) (citations omitted).

7 «jiie "good faith" exception of United States v. Leon, 4u?
U.S. 897 (1984), which the State was required to prove, would not
apply because of the unreasonable belief that probable cause
existed. No nexus was established for a search of the Ahlstrom
residence based upon the "numberous trips" made by Michael Weaver.
See State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987); State v. Droneburq,
701 D ?ri 1303, 1304 (Utah App. 1989).

Even though Ms. Powell was an officer from the Department
of Corrections, her allegation was, at best, an unsupported "belief"
or "conclusion."

Cf. Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 508, 313 A.2d

847 (1974) ("Even assuming 'credibility' amounting to sainthood, the
judge still may not accept the bare conclusion . . . of a sworn ard
known and trusted police-affiant").

Her allegation, lacking

"sufficient information" to support a determination of probable
cause, could not have justified the issuance of a search warrant.
If Ms. Powell's allegation was defective, Detective Powers'
affidavit should not have been relied upon to search the premises.
Detective Powers could not have had probable cause for the search
without receiving "direction" from Ms. Powell.
Alternatively, Detective Powers cannot circumvent the
warrant requirement by assuming the role of a magistrate and
concluding that Ms. Powell's allegation was sufficient.

"[A] searci

and seizure warrant shall issue only when the court—not the
affiant, nor any one apart from the court—shall have found that
there is probable cause to believe that the property described is
unlawfully in the possession of any person."

Allen v. Trueman, 100

Utah 36, 110 P.2d 355, 359 (1941); Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-3 (1989)
("no search warrant shall issue except upon a finding by the
magistrate").

Otherwise, magistrates could accept, without

question, one officer's statement because it was based u p m another
officer's conclusion:
A police officer who arrived at the "suspicion,"
"belief" or "mere conclusion" that [contraband was]
in someone's possession could not obtain a warrant.
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But he could convey u n a conclusion
another
police officer, who could then secure the warrant by
swearing that he had "received reliable information
from a credible person" that the [contraband was] in
someone's possession.
Illinois v. Gates, 41»,- 11 i;

*w o ,*. ~ xBrennan

"*"

dissenting)

(citations omitted).
Suspect n>'",f Michael Weaver as a participant
Detective Powers arrived
IK

nclusion that

in the Weaver residenc*

Powers kne
"requested
-

-

ilin

,*

^idence

***

* ,- L'O

t:„.e

?

*

merchandise \i .
residence."

merchandise may

residence could be searchec

v_J .
, ' ,

mothei

,

search

'

usty's Vans .**• <

o

^ i 4 at

: ^ .}

(T 5 5 ) . Ms. Powell mini mod powers that Weaver

"! i'*equi:jiit.ed h is mother';? residence, which was o 111 \" . . . 40 or 5»>
yards from where

Lng. He lived

* duplex, .

and she

lived in ihf tR xt duplex dowr

*uented her residence, and

I : l)et»ji,4. ivp t\ wer *; wanted to obtai

search warr.

• <c out

stolen items,11

that residence for

adopted Ms. Powell's allegation to suppnu

i»m

Powers then
iclusory hunch.

short, Detect3 vf- Powers did not adhere f; i. in I-IK- ' '-at.
an officer must "pro

fistrate with a substantial basis for

determining the existence
91b (quoting
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«-

^t:

conclusory
-State v. Babbell

P.2d 987if 992 (Utah 1989) (citing Illinois v, Gates. 462 U.S. 213,
239 (1983)).
The fourth amendment requires that when a
search warrant is issued on the basis of an
affidavit, that affidavit must contain specific
facts sufficient to support a determination by a
neutral magistrate that probable cause exists. The
action of the magistrate, however, must not be "a
mere ratification of the bare conclusions of
others." Otherwise, the magistrate becomes only a
"rubber stamp" for police, abandoning the neutral
and detached role which is "a more reliable
safeguard against improper searches than the hurried
judgment of a law enforcement officer."
Thus, "reviewing courts will not defer to a
warrant based on an affidavit that does not 'provide
the magistrate with a substantial basis for
determining the existence of probable cause.'" Even
a search warrant obtained under an officer's
"objectively reasonable reliance," i.e., "good
faith," cannot be validated if it is clear that the
warrant is based on an affidavit "so lacking in
indicia of probable cause as to render official
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable."
State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303, 1304 (Utah App. 1989) (citations
omitted).

Ms. Powell's allegation and Detective Powers' adoption o::

her statement did not provide the magistrate with a sufficient basis
for determining the existence of probable cause.

The warrant was

invalid.

B.

THE "TOTALITY-OF-APPELLANT'S-CIRCUMSTANCES"
WOULD HAVE PRECLUDED A FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE

Assuming, arguendo, that the information stated in Ms.
Powell's allegation was not insufficient, or that it was not
conclusory, or that Michael Weaver's "numerous trips11 were not
innocent, the court still erred in making an improper analysis of
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United States v. Leon, 4un

the "totality .-i i tw < • i rcumstances."
U.S. 897, 915 (1984).

Detective r<wrs alleged, "through his

expei ipnce «» • belief that Weaver, being
Parole, wot

*

property

.*

knowing that such a place could nil i«
lilliceit, if

Powers' Affidavit, page 3.

Weaver as a partic i pani

lervised
irimary residence
itinely searched by Parole

Having air*

-r-e. :ed

in- 1 hv at imii and inferring that Weaver

carried the "fruits of tin.- crime" irom

.* mother's

hi,< residence

residence, Detective Powers alleged that the stol ei
located at 1)1 d. tvisi

I'nni .'....uid,

Michael Weaver

Supervised Parole
Lawrence.

\,MUU!-

.*

, would have revealed a

suspect on ,l" i nl ffiisi

t'hsnj" .•"! " "in
Powers' Affidavi

"Intense

±

See Powers' Affidavit, page 4.

A common sense determination, I
cont t

,

• . Parole" who was confronted

-: \ -\

mci Lu-cla
suspect on

• *

witnesses* <mcl

8

Ii i his affidavit, Detective Powers admitted reviewing
the initial report of Deputy Gary Cummings and the follow-up report
of Deputy Sterner. Yet, he conveniently omitted the following
material facts from his affidavit. Deputy Sterner reported that
when Mr. Lawrence awoke, he "witnessed the man jumping the fence.
Mr. [Lawrence] yelled from his window, 'Hey, what are you doing?'
The man . . . stated, 'Why, you got a problem?'" See Report
#89-42191 (Follow-up report by Deputy Sterner). At trial, the
Lawrences testified that Michael Weaver actually came up to their
window to explain what he was doing
(T 45).
Another fact reported by Deputy Sterner, but omitted by
Detective Powers, concerned the "fieldcarding" of Michael Weaver on
May 7, 1989. See Report #89-42191 (Follow-up report by Deputy
Sterner). In addition, Detective Powers should not have led the
court to believe that there was only one individual involved in the
burglary who may have attempted to dispose of the property. Powers7
Affidavit, pages 2 & 3. Deputy Cummings reported that "Unknown
(continued)
- ]7 -

subjected to random searches of his house would not have waited for
four full days before deciding to dispose of the property.

See

(T 103). Under the circumstances, four days was an excessive length
of time.
Moreover, if Weaver did not think that the witnesses could
have identified him, his voice, or the truck he drove off in,
cf. (T 103), he certainly would have realized that the police were
"on his trail" when an officer pulled him over for nothing more than
a "fieldcard" stop.

At approximately 5:30 p.m., the day of the

robbery, an officer pulled Weaver over to take down his name, his
address, and his driver's license.

See supra note 8.

Given the circumstances—a positive identification of
Michael Weaver as a suspect in a crime; the fact that his "status"

(footnote 8 continued)
person/s" burglarized "Dusty's Vans." See Report #89-42191 (InitiaL
report by Deputy Cummings). As the jury later determined, other
individuals were involved who could have disposed of the property.
See (R 95-96); (T 99).
Had all the pertinent information been presented to the
court, it may not have authorized the search warrant. "[T]he
deference accorded a magistrate's finding of probable cause does not
preclude inquiry into the knowing or reckless falsity of the
affidavit on which that determination was based." United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1983) (construing Franks v. Delaware, 438
U.S. 154 (1978); State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1986)
("the affidavit must be evaluated to determine if it will support a
finding of probable cause when the omitted information is
inserted"). Nevertheless, the court still should have recognized
the incongruity between Detective Powers' conclusion and his
statements in "support" of his request. The totality of the
circumstances summarized in the last paragraph before Point II, see
supra pages 18-19, were all presented or known to the magistrate.
They did not provide a substantial basis for a finding of probable
cause. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983).
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subjected his house;? ti« rvintloii! searches; the four ^,>T lapse between
the commission of the crime and

rips"; the close

pr ox i in i t v t'»l the * two houses; the familial relations!! I p i nv < » 1 v u -J,
the conclusory unsubstantiated allegatior •; v *;*erred in determining that probable
Powers

P o w e l l — t h e court

* ,•

Detecti e

ned the court, Michael Weaver would not

property at his primary reside net' knowing that sue:
i

xt> routinely searched by Parole Off ice IT "

have recogni

-

n

place could
court should

Detective Powers' conclusion contradict.t*1 I N S

reasoning.

POINT II
NO PROBABLE CAUSE SUPPORTED THE ISSUANCE OF THE SEARCH
WARRANT UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
lf

o

[B]ecause of the similarity b e t w ^ n article
Constitution and the fourth amendment <«

States Constit,nt ititi, ( l,Iic» \)[f\h
drawn
by

, distinctions between

l

S-ita.te._-.:. Larocco,

State v. Watts, 7

Supreme Court has] not
i

section 1 4
niied
- che past

respectively afforded
: :-

ida ±^

(Utah 1990)
Nevertheless, the Court:

~^ no means ruled out the possibility of doing so in
some future case since choosing to give the Utah
Constitution a somewhat different construction may
prove to be an appropriate method for insulating
this state's citizens from the vagaries of
inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth
amendment by the federal courts.
Larocco. "

(citing Watts, 7 5 M F.7d at ??^i n . 8 ) .
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a

The Larocco Court noted that "[t]he United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of the fourth amendment, especially in the
context of automobile searches, has been the source of much
confusion among judges, lawyers, and police."

Larocco, 135 Utah

Adv. Rep. at 21. After citing various problems with the federal
analysis, the Larocco Court attempted to simplify "the search and
seizure rules so that they can be more easily followed by the police
and the courts . . . ." Id. at 23.

If an expectation of privacy Is

shown, the Court held, article I, section 14 applies.

Warrantless

searches will then be permitted only where, after the State has
proven the existence of both probable cause and exigent
circumstance, such a search will "protect the safety of police or
the public or . . . the destruction of evidence."

Id. at 23-24.

Problems also exist with the federal analysis of "probable
cause."

See generally Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 274-91

(1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

In 1983, the Gates Court

announced that it would abandon the "two-pronged" test ("veracity"
and "basis of knowledge") of Aauilar v. Texas. 378 U.S. 108 (1964),
and Spinelli v. United States. 393 U.S. 410 (1969), in favor of a
"totality-of-the circumstances" analysis.9

9

Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.

By abandoning the "two-pronged" test from Aguilar and
Spinelli. the Gates Court was in fact abandoning well established
caselaw. The "Court has developed over the last half a century a
set of coherent rules governing a magistrate's consideration of a
warrant application and the showing that is necessary to support a
finding of probable cause." Gates, 462 U.S. at 275 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). In apparent disregard of these standards, the Gates
Court also ignored a "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" requirement
recognized previously in Utah.
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»ii • onformity with principles recognized

previously in Utah.
Long before Aguilar and Spinelli, the Utah Supreme Cour t
held that well presci iuol .standards should guide the issuing

xu

jyiicnciejL Weaver respectfully requests this court to
consider his analysis of the probable cause determination under
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution for the reasons
stated or for any other reason deemed appropriate by this Court.
In the past, Utah's appellate courts have seemed to express a
willingness to consider alternative approaches under the Utah
Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d no'*
)4t
n.l (Utah App. 1989).
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magistrate's determination of what is or is not an unreasonable
search or seizure.

City of Price v. Jaynes, 113 Utah 89, 191 P.2i

606 (1948) . A magistrate should not be able to consider the
totality of the circumstances.

See id.

In Jaynes, three defendants were convicted of violating £n
ordinance of the City of Price.

The ordinance provided in pertinent

part:
The right of the people of the City of Price, County
of Carbon, State of Utah, to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated.
Price City Ordinance No. 1050 reprinted in Jaynes, 191 P.2d at 607,
After noting the similarities between the United States Constitution
and the Price City Ordinance, the Jaynes Court stated:
We are not furnished with any guides as to what are
reasonable or unreasonable searches and seizures.
No answer is it to say that the magistrate who hears
a charge under the ordinance may consult the
statutes and the decisions in the files of American
law and by that exploration delineate the area of
reasonable from the area of unreasonable searches
and seizures. This would put an intolerable if not
an impossible burden on the magistrate.
191 P.2d at 608.
While the Price City Ordinance did not contain the clause
of the Fourth Amendment which states, "no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized," the Jaynes Court did recognize that this
clause:
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proceeds to set out the preliminary steps necessary
to a lawful search of a dwelling house or a
structure. But the general protection given by the
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search and
seizure did not prevent other and different
conditions as a prereguisite of search or of seizure
in respect to different laws designed to accomplish
a social or governmental purpose.
Id. (emphasis added).
The Court added that the ordinance expressed only "an
existing right and a declared policy.

It does not set out with

sufficient definiteness the act or acts prohibited or denounced."
Id.

Concluding that "[t]he acts condemned as unreasonable searches

and seizures are nowhere defined in reference to the results
necessary to be accomplished," the Court reasoned:
Evidently the test of what is an unreasonable search
or seizure is left to standards not prescribed in
the ordinance of Price City but to the exploration
in fields of law which prescribe such standards for
the state of Utah or the other states. This leaves
the tests too much in the air and dependent in each
case on what the magistrate hearing the case may
within the light of his very limited or plenary
knowledge conclude to be reasonable or unreasonable.
Id. at 609 (emphasis added).
The Jaynes Court thus expressed a willingness to consider
"the general protection given by the Fourth Amendment against
unreasonable search and seizure," but, because a magistrate should
not be left with an unprescribed test "too much in the air," the
Court allowed "other and different" protections to serve as a
"prerequisite of search or of seizure."

Hence, a single factor may

serve as a necessary protection for a lawful search and seizure.
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Though the exact words were not used, the Jay^es decision rejected a
"totality-of-the-circumstances" analysis.
The search and seizure prerequisites were established, in
part, by the decisions of Allen v. Lindbeck, 97 Utah 471, 93 P.2d
920 (1939), and Allen v. Holbrook, 103 Utah 319, 135 P.2d 242
(1943).

In Lindbeck, the Utah Supreme Court considered whether

"'probable cause' [was] satisfied by an oath that one 'has reason to
believe and does believe[.]'"
P.2d 920 (1939).

Allen v. Lindbeck, 97 Utah 471, 93

Initially citing with approval "the general rule

that probable cause is not shown by an affidavit on information an<i
belief which does not state the facts showing the grounds of the
belief," the Lindbeck Court subsequently held, "in line with the
overwhelming weight of authority in the federal and state court,
that such an affidavit [based only on reason and belief] does not
meet the constitutional requirements . . • ."

Id. at 923.

Four years later, in Allen v. Holbrook, 103 Utah 319, 135
P.2d 242 (1943), the Court reaffirmed its holding of Lindbeck and
specifically questioned the conclusory statements alleged by the
affiant.

According to the Court, the affiant's conclusory

statements had "no facts being set forth upon which a complaint for
perjury could be predicated if falsely given . . . The affidavit
does not show probable cause to exist for the issuance of a search
and seizure warrant under the general laws and the Constitution of
the State of Utah."

Holbrook, 135 P.2d at 247.

In fact, the Holbrook Court expressly discounted the
alleged prior criminal record of the defendant and his alleged
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"continuing" criminal activity in its determination of probable
cause:
the affidavit must set forth facts sufficient to
cause a discreet and prudent man to believe that the
accused had the property sought to be seized. The
fact that the affiant says he has that belief, in
and of itself, is not sufficient to make probable
cause. Furthermore, the allegation in the affidavit
that said defendant has twice during the past three
months been arrested and convicted for the illegal
use of said bottles, and that he refused to refrain
from using them is not sufficient to make probable
cause as contemplated by the general statute or the
Constitution. The affidavit in this case further
sets forth that defendant now freely admits that he
is continuing the use thereof. This is a mere
conclusion of the affiant; no facts being set forth
upon which a complaint for perjury could be
predicated if falsely given. The substance of the
admission is not given nor is the person named to
whom the purported admission was made. The
affidavit does not show probable cause to exist for
the issuance of a search and seizure warrant under
the general laws and the Constitution of the State
of Utah.
Holbrgok, 135 P.2d at 247.
The principles announced in Lindbeck and Holbrook provided
needed guidance for a "probable cause" determination under
Article I, Section 14, of the Utah Constitution.

At the very least,

both decisions indicate that the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge"
standards remain strict prerequisites for establishing probable
cause under the Utah Constitution.

For the reasons stated

previously in Point I and because of the more clearly defined and
recognized protections afforded individuals under the Utah
Constitution, Detective Powers' affidavit did not justify a finding
of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.
warrant was invalid.
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The

POINT III
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE MUST BE SUPPRESSED,
Since the "Affidavit For Search Warrant" was unlawful, tte
evidence seized during the subsequent search should have been
suppressed,

"[E]xclusion of illegally obtained evidence is a

necessary consequence of police violations of article I, section 11
[of the Utah Constitution]."

State v, Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472

(Utah 1990); cf. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 961 (1984)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("We cannot
intelligibly assume, arguendo, that a search was constitutionally
unreasonable but that the seized evidence is admissible because the
same search was reasonable"); see supra note 7.

CONCLUSION
Ap>pellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse hi 3
conviction and remand this case for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this

[*f

day of September, 1990.

-<M-£uhM/pj
KAREN STAM

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

RONALD S.l
FU,
RONALD
S.\ FUJINO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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this

day of September, 1990.
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ADDENDUM A

AMENDMENT 4
Unreasonable searches and seizures.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of warrant]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported byoath or alBrmation, pariicularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or thing to be seized.

76-6-404. Theft — Elements.
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.

77-23-3. Conditions precedent to issuance.
(1) A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause supported
by oath or affirmation particularly describing the person or place to be
searched and the person, property or evidence to be seized.
J
(2) If the item sought to be seized is evidence of illegal conduct and is in the
possession of a person or entity for which there is insufficient probable cause
shown to the magistrate to believe that such person or entity is a party to the
alleged illegal conduct, no search warrant shall issue except upon afindingby
the magistrate that the evidence sought to be seized cannot be obtained by
subpoena or that such evidence would be concealed, destroyed, damaged, or
altered if sought by subpoena. If such a finding is made and a search warrant
issued, the magistrate shall direct upon the warrant such conditions that
reasonably afford protection of the following interests of the person or entity
in possession of such evidence:
(a) Protection against unreasonable interference with normal business;
or
(b) Protection against the loss or disclosure of protected confidential
sources of information; or
'—u — Sw OT" dirpcfc restraints on constitutionally pro-

ADDENDUM B

AVID E. YOCOM
ounty Attorney
y: GREGORY G. SKORDAS
eputy County Attorney
ourtside Office Building
31 East 400 South, 3rd Floor
ialt Lake City, Utah 84111
>hone: (801) 363-7900

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
)

County of Salt Lake

AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
BEFORE:

Sheila McCleve
JUDGE

450 South 2nd East
ADDRESS

The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he has reason to believe:
That on the premises known as 1316 East 3900 South, the
eastraost unit in a duplex located on 3900 South.
The duplex is
reddish-orange brick with a pink roof and a swamp cooler in the roof.
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there
is now certain property or evidence described as:
^J^jTwo Ninetendo Games (brain and paddles);
^ ^ n e Cosmo 5" TV Model CTV 701;
^ - N -Two Magnavox VCP Model #VR9602AT01;
v^JJhOne Tote Vision VCP;
^5r*0ne 9" Samsung TV;
One 9" Sony TV;
One Alpine AM/FM Cassette Car Stereo (black);
CA\ -*k Panasonic Stereo AM/FM Cassette Car Stereo (black);
VSJ ***Two Samsong VCP Model VP 2215'.

(Continued on page 2)

^

^t^w^ov*0!

PAGE 2
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
and that said property or evidence:
(x) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or
(x) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or
(x) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means
of committing or concealing a public offense, or
(x) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct, or
(x) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to
the illegal conduct.
[Note requirements of Utah Coie
Annotated, 77-23-3(2)]*
Affiant believes
evidence of the
Property.

the property and evidence described
above
s
crime(s) of Burglary, Theft, Receiving
Stolen

The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant
are:
Affiant, Leslie Kent Powers, is a detective with the Salt
Lake County Sheriff's Office and has been such for 1 1/2 years.
Affiant has been a deputy Salt Lake County Sheriff for 5 years.
Affiant is currently assigned as a burglary detective assigned as
such for the past 1 1/2 years with Salt Lake County. Affiant has ha 1
extensive training with local law enforcement in the area of burglar^
investigation.
Affiant has reviewed the report #89-42191 (Initial Report) ol
Deputy Gary Curamings which alleges tht on or about May 7, 198$
someone entered into the east back building of DustyTs Vans at 340E
South State in Salt Lake County through the east doors. Entry was
made by prying a metal door. Joe Torres of Dusty1s Vans reports that
the forced entry was made between 2300 hours on May 6, 1989 and 1025
hours on May 7, 1989 and that the items listed above were removed
from the building, valued at well over $1,000.00.
Affiant has reviewed the report #89-42191 (follow-up report)
of Deputy Sterner which alleges that the deputy interviewed Dave
Torgerson
of Dusty 1 s
Vans who
located
two witresses
to
the
above-referenced burglary.

(Continued uu page 3)

GE 3
FIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

Affiant personally interviewed witnesses Jay Larance and
nda Larance who stated that they were awakened at 700 hours on May
1989 by someone who was jumping back and forth over a fence
:tween her residence (apartment) and Dustyfs Vans. Both of these
tnesses observed the man who then got into a blue Mitsubishi truck,
.th a temporary sticker in the rear window. The man was identified
> approximately 6' tall, in his 30Ts with short blonde hair wearing
lorts and a black tank top.
Affiant
showed
both
witnesses
a photospread
including
saver's picture and he was positively identified by both witnesses
5 the man described above, observed climbing the fence to Dusty1s
ans.
Weaver
is currently
on
Intense
Supervised
Parole
for
eceiving Stolen Property and is supervised by Sally Powell from the
epartment of Corrections.
Weaver resides at 1328 East 3900 South
ith his grandmother.
Weaver's mother resides at the house to be
earched.
Affiant has interviewed Ms. Powell who alleges that on May
1, 1989, Weaver made numerous trips (5-6) between the houses and in
act was at the house to be searched on the evening of May 10, 1989.
Affiant alleges through his experience and belief that
eaver, being on Intense Supervised Parole, would not keep stolen
>roperty at his primary residence knowing that such a place could and
s routinely searched by Parole Officers. Further, affiant alleges
;hat there
is probable cause, because of the
above-mentioned
zircumstances and Weaver's activity, to believe that the stolen
>roperty sought to be seized is located at the property to be
searched hereby.
r

Such evidence would be cancealed, destroyed, damaged, or
altered if sought by subpoena.
A no-knock warrant is not reauested
iere. It is reauested that the home be searched during regular hours
Ln a manner least intrusive to other occupants.

(Continued on page 4)

PAGE 4
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the
seizure of said items:
(x) in the day time.

AFFIANT
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this

/

^ay

1989.

.RCU1T C 6 U R T \
IN AND FOR 'SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH
•':'- ..T ~. /.;
lls/3445E

/ID E. YOCOM
jnty Attorney
: GREGORY G. SKORDAS
puty County Attorney
urtside Office Building
1 East 400 South, 3rd Floor
It Lake City, Utah 84111
one: (801) 363-7900

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SEARCH WARRANT
No.
OUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
o any peace officer in the State of Utah.
'roof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by
)etective L. Powers - SLCSO, I am satisfied that there is probable
zause to believe
That on the premises known as 1316 East 3900 South, the
sastraost unit in a duplex located on 3900 South.
The duplex is
reddish-orange brick with a pink roof and a swamp cooler in the roof.
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there
is now certain property or evidence .described as:
Two Ninetendo Games (brain and paddles);
One Cosmo 5" TV Model CTV 701;
Two Magnavox VCP Model #VR9602AT01;
One Tote Vision VCP;
One 9t! Samsung TV;
One 9" Sony TV;
One Alpine AM/FM Cassette Car Stereo (black);
Panasonic Stereo AM/FM Cassette Car Stereo (black);
Two Sarasong VCP Model VP 2215.

(Continued on page 2)

PAGE 2
SEARCH WARRANT

and that said property or evidence:
(x) was unlawfully acauired or is unlawfully possessed, or
(x) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or
(x) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a meais
of committing or concealing a public offense, or
(x) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegil
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct, or
(x) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party 10
the illegal conduct.
[Note requirements of Utah Coce
Annotated, 77-23-3(2)]
You are therefore commanded:
(x) in the day time
to make
a search
of the above-named
or described
person(s),
vehicle(s), and premises for the herein-above described property or
evidence and if you find the same or any part thereof, to bring it
forthwith before me at the Third Circuit Court, County of Salt Lake,
State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject to
the order of this court,
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this
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